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NATURE OF THE CASE 
The action in the Lower Court was one brought EXCLUSIVELY by the 
limited partners of Appellant, Young Farms, Ltd. ("Young Farms"), a Utah limited 
partnership, (i) for an accounting of partnership transactions from Defendant, 
Richtron, Inc. ("Richtron), (which had previously withdrawn and retired as 
general partner of Young Farms and was then the court decreed liquidating 
general partner thereof), (ii) for a Writ of Replevin requiring Richtron and 
Defendant, Paul H. Richins ("Paul Richins"), to deliver to Plaintiffs all assets 
of Young Farms including its money and other property alleged misappropriated, 
(iii) for a judgment against Richtron and Paul Richins for any monies received 
from Young Farms during its existence to be determined by an ACCOUNTING, (iv) 
for a judgment declaring that Richtron has no interest in the properties of 
Young Farms, and (v) for a determination that Richtron is the "alter-ego" of 
Paul Richins and he should be liable for the actions of Richtron. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT 
Prior to dismissal of the case in the Lower Court, Judge Douglas L. 
Cornaby granted "Partial Summary Judgment" against Richtron declaring that 
because Milton R. Goff had purchased at an Internal Revenue Service Tax Sale all 
of Richtron's rights and interest in the real property, which was the subject of 
Appellants Amended Complaint, and then resold them to Young Farms, Richtron 
therefor had no interest in any such disputed real property interests. 
Appellants claim in their Amended Complaint that Richtron had no interest in the 
real property because of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty of Richtron to 
Young Farms, but that issue was never adjudicated in the case. Both Richtron 
and Tower Real Estate ("Tower) claimed they were the general partner of Young 
Farms, but that issue was NOT adjudicated in the case either, for it had been 
adjudicated previously in another similar case in favor of Richtron. 
Under the "Partial Summary Judgment", Richtron and Paul Richins were 
dismissed from the case. Richtron and Paul Richins appealed such Judgment. 
Prior to dismissal, Richtron and Paul Richins were ordered to deposit an 
aggregate of $10,431 into Court "until the final conclusion of the matter". Leo 
H. Richins (a non-party) contributed $10,431 into Court on behalf of Paul 
Richins. Richtron did NOT pay its $10,431 as ordered. After said dismissal, 
Judge Cornaby entered a Ruling that the $10,431 paid into Court by Leo Richins 
should be returned to him, "the source from which it came", if Richtron and Paul 
Richins withdrew their appeal of the Partial Summary Judgment. Based upon said 
Ruling and representation of Judge Cornaby, such other appeal was immediately 
withdrawn. Later, Judge Cornaby entered an Order (which is the one on appeal) 
reaffirming his earlier Ruling that if such other appeal were dismissed, it 
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would be proper to return the $10,431 to Leo Richins, but as long as such other 
appeal remained in process, the $10,431 should remain with the Clerk of Court. 
SAID ORDER WAS ENTERED AFTER SUCH OTHER APPEAL HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THE CASE 
DISMISSED. Nevertheless, Judge Cornaby still refused to deliver the $10,431 to 
Leo Richins or to Paul Richins for whose benefit it was delivered. 
The District Court thereafter conducted an Evidentiary Hearing on the 
sole issue (which had been dismissed) of who owned the $10,431 on deposit. 
Judge Cornaby would NOT allow Richtron and Paul Richins to present any evidence 
at the Evidentary Hearing respecting the money, because they had been previously 
dismissed from the case. After the Evidentiary Hearing, Judge Cornaby reaffirmed 
his previous Ruling and Order by rendering his "Findings of Fact and Ruling" 
that the $10,431 was owned by Leo Richins and "should go back to the same source 
from which it came", but added that "the $10,431 is not to be removed from the 
custody of the Clerk of the Court until the plaintiffs have an opportunity for a 
final determination of this RULING by the appellate process." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek (i) a reversal of the "Order", entered in the Lower 
Court on January 9, 1984, (ii) a reversal of the "Findings of Fact and Ruling", 
entered in the Lower Court on February 8, 1984, (AFTER entry of the aforesaid 
"Order" involving the same subject matter), and (iii) a determination that the 
$10,431 deposited for the benefit of Paul Richins (a dismissed party) by Leo 
Richins (a non-party), which is the subject of the "Order" and subsequent 
"Findings of Fact and Ruling", somehow belongs to Appellants and cannot be 
returned to a non-party in the Lower Court (but an Intervenor in this Court). 
Appellants seek such relief notwithstanding (i) only final orders and 
judgments are appealable, and certainly not findings of fact or rulings, (ii) 
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("Limited Partners") against Richtron, a Utah corporation, its retired general 
partner, and Paul Richins, President of Richtron. Notwithstanding Young Farms 
appears as a Plaintiff-Appellant, Richtron is the stipulated and court decreed 
liquidating general partner of Young Farms and has NOT authorized Young Farms to 
bring this Appeal (R. 521-550; par. 12, 523). 
2. On November 15, 1974, Richtron purchased the "Allred Property" (480 
acres) and the "Freston Property" (368 acres), in the name of "Richtron, Inc.", 
from Robert M. and Betty Jean Young ("Youngs") under the "Young/Richtron 
Contract" in escrow at Defendant, Bank of Utah ("Bank") (Exhibit A). The Youngs 
had previously purchased the Allred Property from Defendants, Aral Wesley and 
Sarah Elaine Allred ("Allreds") under the "Allred Contract", and the Freston 
Property from J. Dorrant and Ethelene Freston, under the "Freston Contract". 
Under the Young/Richtron Contract, Richtron agreed, of itself, to assume and 
make payments on the underlying Allred Contract and Freston Contract (Exhibit A, 
par. 18). 
3. On November 15, 1974, Young Farms purchased the Allred Property and 
Freston Property from Richtron pursuant to the wrap-around "RichtronAoung Farms 
Contract" in escrow at the Bank (Exhibit B). The Limited Partners are NOT 
parties to such Contract. (See Footnote below.) 
4. On February 20, 1981, Richtron made its November 15, 1980, $10,431 
payment on the Allred Contract to the excrow at the Bank (R. 191, par. 3; 194; 
Exhibit D), and on December 7, 1981, RICHTRON (not Paul Richins) withdrew the 
money from the Bank (R. 115, par. 2; Exhibit G; Affidavit of Joseph S. Knowlton, 
Jan. 6, 1982). 
(Footnote - Upon formation of Young Farms, Richtron disclosed to the 
Limited Partners that Young Farms was purchasing such properties under different 
purchasing terms than those of Richtronfs, and at a profit to Richtron on the 
sale of such properties to Young Farms, pursuant to a "Private Placement 
Memorandum", dated November 15, 1974, used in offering participation interests 
in Young Farms to the Limited Partners.) 
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5. On or about February 10, 1982, the District Court entered an Order 
requiring both Richtron and its President, Paul Richins, to deposit $10,431 with 
the Clerk of the Court "pending the determination of the rights of the parties 
in the Allred Contract and the properties underlying said contract" (R. 
234-235). At the time of such Order, the Allreds were not parties (R. 234-235). 
6. On or about February 16, 1982, Plaintiffs filed their "Amended 
Complaint" (R. 236) against Richtron and Paul Richins seeking the relief 
described under "Nature of Case" above (R. 236-242). 
7. On or about March 17, 1982, Leo Richins obtained from the Barnes 
Banking Company, Kaysville, Utah, at the request of Paul Richins and on Paul 
Richins1 personal behalf (R. 625-626), a Letter of Credit payable to the Second 
Judicial District Court for $10,431 in an attempt to help Paul Richins meet his 
requirement under the February 10, 1982, Order to deposit the money. The Letter 
of Credit was issued for the "account of Leo H. Richins". (Exhibit E). 
8. On December 14, 1982, the District Court entered an order declaring 
that the Letter of Credit was NOT SUFFICIENT in that it appeared to be revocable 
and did not provide for interim interest. Judge Cornaby ordered that Leo 
Richins1 Letter of Credit be amended to provide for interest pending the outcome 
of the case (R. 360). 
9. On January 25, 1983, Milton Goff, Trustee in Trust, allegedly 
assigned, transfered and quit claimed to Young Farms all his rights, title and 
interest in the property and property rights belonging to RICHTRON, which 
property rights were allegedly obtained by Goff pursuant to a purchase of the 
same at a Federal Tax Sale. Said assignment allegedly covered all property and 
interests known as Young Farms and the property belonging to Young Farms, which 
included the Allred Property (R. 493-517). 
10. On April 22, 1983, Judge Cornaby ruled that no change to Leo 
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Richins1 Letter of Credit had been made and entered an Order requiring Richtron 
and Paul Richins to deposit $10,431 in cash into Court within 30 days because no 
change had been made (R. 442). No cash deposit was made within 30 days by 
Richtron or Paul Richins as ordered (R. 453). 
11. On June 9, 1983, Judge Cornaby ruled that "defendant, RICHTRON, 
INC., has not deposited their $10,431" into Court and entered an Order for the 
Clerk of the Court to collect from Barnes Banking Company $10,431 in accordance 
with the terms of the Letter of Credit provided by Leo Richins (on behalf of 
Paul Richins) "to be deposited with the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk to 
invest the said sum in interest-bearing certificates UNTIL THE FINAL CONCLUSION 
OF THIS MATTER" (R. 453-454). The Clerk of the Court then sent a letter to the 
Barnes Banking Company demanding payment on Leo Richins1 theretofore 
INSUFFICIENT Letter of Credit (R. 486). 
12. On October 3, 1983, Plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment" substantially seeking a determination that RICHTRON, INC., had no 
interest in any of the real estate properties which where part of the case 
(because of the prior assignment by Goff to Young Farms). No relief was 
requested for a determination respecting who owned to the $10,431 on deposit 
with the Clerk of the Court via the Court drawing down Leo H. Richins1 Letter of 
Credit (R. 491-512). 
13. On November 1, 1983, Paul Richins filed his "Defendant Paul H. 
Richins1 Motion to Dismiss as Against Young Farms, Ltd. for Lack of Capacity and 
Authority to Sue", which was never heard. 
14. On November 9, 1983, the District Court entered its "Partial 
Summary Judgment" adjudicating, in part, that: 
"that the Amended Complaint against the defendant, Paul H. Richins, 
is hereby dismissed without prejudice",...that there was no counsel 
present with any objection to the Motion for Partial Summary 
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Judgment against the defendant, Richtron, Inc.,"..."that the 
documents on file herein indicate that there are no material facts 
in dispute in regard to any claim that defendant, Richtron, Inc., 
might have in regard to the interest in the properties that are the 
subject of this action",..."that Richtron, Inc., has no right, 
title or interest or claim to or in the real property which is the 
subject matter of this suit",...and "the defendant, Richtron, Inc., 
is herewith dismissed out of this case." 
15. On December 1, 1983, Richtron and Paul Richins filed their "Notice 
of Appeal" thereby appealing the District Court's "Partial Summary Judgment" 
entered November 9, 1983 (R. 593; 598). 
16. On December 7, 1983, after dismissal of Appellants1 Amended 
Complaint against Richtron and Paul Richins, by way of the "Partial Summary 
Judgment", PAUL RICHINS, on his own behalf and for Leo Richins, sent a letter to 
the District Court requesting redelivery of the $10,431 deposited via Leo 
Richins' Letter of Credit (R. 600). 
17. On December 8, 1983, in answer to PAUL RICHINS1 written request for 
redelivery of the $10,431, because Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint had been 
dismissed against Richtron and Paul Richins, Judge Cornaby entered his "Ruling 
on PAUL RICHINS' Request for Refund", stating that (R. 606): 
"If the defendants dismiss the appeal, then it would 
appear proper to return the $10,431 to Leo Richins. 
As long as the appeal remains in process, the amount 
should remain with the clerk of the court. The 
defendants' request to return the $10,431 deposit 
is denied." 
18. On December 20, 1983, after said dismissal of Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint which included their claim for the $10,431 (R. 236-242, pars. 24-25), 
Plaintiffs filed a "Motion to Appeal Ruling on Paul Richins Request for Refund" 
(R. 609). Plaintiffs did NOT submit any affidavit in support of their claims to 
the $10,431. Said Motion alleges that: 
"under no conditons does this money belong to the defendant Paul 
H. Richins, Richtron, Inc., or Leo Richins. This money belongs to 
the plaintiffs..." 
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19. On December 20, 1983, on the same day Plaintiffs filed their 
"Motion to Amend Ruling on Paul Richins' Request for Refund", and without 
Richtron and Paul Richins having adequate notice and an opportunity to file 
their objections to Plaintiffs' Motion under Rule 2.8 of the Local Rules of 
Practice, the District Court granted an "Evidentiary Hearing" on Plaintiffs1 
Motion (R. 614) and heard it on January 3, 1984. Plaintiffs1 Motion was denied 
(R. 647). 
20. On January 3, 1984, based on the respected representations of 
Judge Cornaby in his December 8, 1983, Ruling that would release Leo Richins1 
$10,431 if Richtron and Paul Richins withdrew their appeals, a "Notice of 
Withdrawal of Appeal" was filed and such other appeal was subsequently dismissed 
(R. 631). 
21. On January 9, 1984, the District Court entered an "Order" (which 
was signed on January 11, 1984, two days after it was filed) wherein it 
reaffirmed, word for word, its "Ruling on PAUL RICHINS1 Request for Refund", 
dated December 8, 1983 However, the "Order" does NOT ORDER, ADJUDICATE OR DECREE 
ANYTHING and is not a final order or judgment. (R. 652). 
22. On January 12, 1984, upon motion of the Plaintiffs and AFTER THE 
CASE HAD BEEN DISMISSED against Richtron and Paul Richins, the District Court 
conducted an Evidentiary Hearing with respect to who owned and should be 
entitled to receive the $10,431 deposited by Leo Richins (R. 648). 
23. At said Evidentiary Hearing, the District Court denied Paul 
Richins his right to present evidence and testimony in his defense with respect 
to the $10,431, notwithstanding Plaintiffs1 claim to it adversely affected him 
and Leo Richins who provided it for him (R. 648) (Tr. 8:6-13,18-21). Judge 
Cornaby ruled that Paul Richins had been previously dismissed from the case and 
was no longer a party. Nevertheless, the District Court took evidence and 
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testimony EXCLUSIVELY FROM PLAINTIFFS on a claim, under Plaintiffs1 Amended 
Complaint, that had been previously dimissed on Plaintiffs1 own initiative (R. 
236, pars. 8,9,10,11,13,15). 
24. At said Evidentiary Hearing, Paul Richins testified that: 
(a) In January, 1981, LTD Investments (who had by then purchased 
the Freston Property from Young Farms) paid Richtron, as liquidating general 
partner of Young Farms, $52,000 under the "Young Farms/LTD Investments Contract" 
in excrow at First Security Bank in Roosevelt (Tr. 43:2-10). Paul Richins, 
acting on behalf of Richtron, then took it up to the Bank and made a $32,396 
payment on the "Richtron/Young Farms Contract" in escrow (Tr. 43:8-10). 
Richtron did not immediately make a payment on the Allred Contract because 
Richtron was not then required, had a grace period, and simply took advantage of 
it (Tr. 43:15-22). 
(b) Leo Richins and Lucille Richins, the parents of Paul Richins, 
later provided $9,310.33 to Richtron (Tr. 45:20-25) and the money was secured 
with an interest in some contracts (Tr. 44:18-25; 45:1-3). Paul Richins made 
out a check on behalf of Richtron, for $10,431 (Exhibit D). Lucille Richins 
delivered it to the Bank on February 20, 1981 (Tr. 22:7-13; 20:24-25; 21:1-2), 
as per Lucille Richins1 Affidavit in the file (R. 191). 
(c) The $10,431 payment was sent by the Bank to Gayle McKeachnie, 
Allreds" lawyer. He felt the payment was late, which Richtron immediately 
denied, and sent it back to the Bank where it sat for several months (Tr. 
24:11-18). 
(d) On December 4, 1982, Paul Richins, acting on behalf of 
Richtron, hand delivered a letter (Exhibit F) to Frank Hazen of the Bank (Tr. 
24:8-9) which represented a written tender for the $10,431 payment (R.644). On 
the same date, at the request of Paul Richins, acting on behalf of Richtron, the 
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Bank delivered a check (Exhibit G) for $10,431 to Paul Richins, acting on behalf 
of Richtron (Tr. 25:6-8; 25:14-17; 26:1-8) (R. 199-201). 
(e) The $10,431 check was deposited in the bank account of 
Richtron (Tr. 26:7-8; 27:7-8), and from there was paid over to the law firm of 
Roe and Fowler on the same day as legal fees for Richtron (Tr. 27:9-14; 
70:23-25; 71-5-11). 
(f) On February 11, 1982, a "Minute Entry" was entered (R. 233), 
pursuant to Plaintiffs1 motion, wherein "RICHTRON, INC." was required to put 
into Court the $10,431, but for some reason the Order says "defendants" (R. 234) 
(Tr. 28:13-21). 
(g) Following the February 16, 1982, Order requiring Richtron and 
Paul Richins to deposit $10,431 into Court ("pending the determination of the 
rights of the parties in the Contract and the properties underlying said 
contract") (R. 234), Paul Richins solicited and received from Leo Richins a 
Letter of Credit drawn on Barnes Banking Company in favor of the District Court 
(Exhibit H) in order for PAUL RICHINS (not Richtron) to comply with such Order 
(Tr. 27:19-23; 29:2-3,23-24; 30:16-19; 31:15-18,24-25; 32:1-2; 57:18-25; 
58:1-11,16-25; 60:14-21) (R. 625-628). 
(h) The Letter of Credit was delivered to the Court on behalf of 
Paul Richins (who had no interest in the property (R. 625, pars. 3,4) or any 
obligation to pay a corporate debt with respect thereto) and not on behalf of 
Richtron, or any obligation it may have had (Tr. 27:19-23; 29:2-3,23-24; 
30:16-19; 31:15-18,24-25; 32:1-2; 57:18-25; 58:1-11,16-25; 60:14-21). 
(i) Young Farms never made their ($32,396 November 15, 1981) 
payment to Richtron (Tr. 62:14-16) (R. 641; 171, pars. 15-16). 
25. At said Evidentiary Hearing, Leo Richins testified that: 
(a) Leo and Lucille Richins provided $9,310.33 to Richtron in 
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order for Richtron to make the (November 15, 1980, $10,431) payment on the 
Allred Contract (Tr. 77:15-25; 78:1-9). 
(b) In consideration for the $9,310.33, Leo received an interest 
in a contract (Tr. 79:6-15). 
(c) Paul Richins later told Leo he had taken the $10,431 payment 
on the Allred Contract out of the Bank, a portion of which Leo Richins had 
provided earlier, and paid it as a legal fee to David Leta (Tr. 82:3-8). 
(d) On or about March 25, 1982, Paul Richins requested Leo to 
provide some other monies for him (Tr. 80:21-24; 81:1). 
(e) Leo provided the Letter of Credit on behalf of Paul Richins, 
pursuant to the February 10, 1982, Order which Paul Richins was then under, and 
not on behalf of Richtron or for any obligation Richtron may have had (Tr. 
84:11-14; 87:22-25; 89:6-9; 90:11-14; 92:14-16). 
(f) Leo received NO CONSIDERATION for issuance of the Letter of 
Credit for Paul Richins and provided it as an accommodation for Paul Richins 
(Tr. 88:1-7; 90:11-16). 
(g) Leo deposited the $10,431 into Court and it should not go 
back to Paul Richins, but should go back to "the source from which it came" — 
LEO RICHINS! (Tr. 89:15-23). 
(h) Leo had no idea who the parties were in the lawsuit when he 
provided the Letter of Credit for Paul Richins or why the Court required it (Tr. 
91:12-14; 84:11-19; 88:20-25). 
(i) Leo definitely has an interest in the action; the $10,431 is 
his; he provided it; he is the source from which it came; and it should go back 
to him (Tr. 93:7-13,18-23). 
26. At said Evidentiary Hearing, Lucille Richins testified that: 
(a) Lucille and Leo Richins provided $9,310.33 to RICHTRON which 
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represented the majority of the (December 15, 1980, Richtron) payment on the 
Allred Contract (Tr. 96:18-20). 
(b) Lucille delivered a check for the (November 15, 1980, 
$10,431) payment for Richtron to the Bank on February 20, 1981 (Tr. 96:8-13). 
(c) The money was needed to make a payment on the Allred Contract 
on behalf of RICHTRON (Tr. 97:16-19). 
(d) Lucille knew that Leo Richins1 Letter of Credit was provided 
on or about March 15, 1982 (Tr. 14-18). 
(e) Paul Richins asked Lucille and Leo Richins to provide a 
$10,431 Letter of Credit for Paul Richins personally because he personally was 
under a court order to provide $10,431 to be deposited in the Court, and they so 
provided it (Tr. 99:19-25; 100:20-23). 
(f) Lucille understood that the $10,431 payment into Court (via 
the Letter of Credit) was to be put there because the Court had ordered Paul 
Richins personally to put $10,431 into Court (Tr. 100:1-8). 
(g) The Letter of Credit was provided for PAUL RICHINS personally 
and NOT for Richtron (Tr. 99:22-25; 100:20-25; 101:1-4,18-25; 102:9-10). 
(h) There was NO CONSIDERATION in return for the Letter of Credit 
(Tr. 101:5-7). 
27. At the conclusion of said Evidentiary Hearing, Judge Cornaby 
ruled that: 
(a) There was no question that Young Farms paid their (November 
15, 1980) payment to RICHTRON, as required by the (Richtron/Young Farms) 
contract (Tr. 104:9-12). 
(b) Lucille Richins delivered the ($10,431, November 15, 1980, 
Allred Contract) payment to the Bank on February 20, 1981, but the payment was 
not credited until three days later (Tr. 105:5-9). The Allreds refused the 
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payment, sent it back, and the money remained with the Bank for approximately 
one year. (Tr. 105:14-15; 106:10-12). 
(c) Later, Paul Richins, on behalf of Richtron, sent a letter to 
the Bank requesting that the money be returned to RICHTRON (Tr. 105:18-21). The 
Bank returned the $10,431 to RICHTRON (Tr. 105:21-23) (Exhibits F and G). The 
Bankfs check shows it related to the Allred Contract (Tr. 106:2-3). 
(d) Leo and Lucille Richins loaned $9,310.33 in order to make the 
initial (November 15, 1980) payment to the Bank. The money was placed in the 
RICHTRON account. Richtron made up the difference, and a payment was made by 
RICHTRON for the entire amount on February 20, 1981 (Tr. 106:4-9). Richtron and 
Frontier Investments received the money and spent at least $10,000 of it for 
attorney's fees for RICHTRON or Frontier (Tr. 106:13-16). 
(e) The Court entered an Order, dated December 14, 1982 (R. 359), 
that Defendants (Richtron and Paul Richins) either give the Court a letter of 
credit that included interest or else pay the cash into Court, because if the 
Plaintiffs WON THE CASE (which was dismissed later) they had a right to it IF IT 
WAS DECIDED THEY SHOULD RECEIVE IT (Tr. 107:15-21). Neither was done (Tr. 
107:22), so the Court forced the money (behind Leo Richins1 Letter of Credit) to 
be put into the Court as cash so it would draw interest, and that's where it has 
been since (Tr. 107:24-25). 
(f) The Richinses testified the Letter of Credit "was what they 
considered a personal letter for PAUL RICHINS, not a loan to Richtron or 
Frontier Equities or any other corporation, and the Court so finds." (Tr. 
108:12-15) 
(g) The Richinses "received NO CONSIDERATION for the letter of 
credit", but "obviously did it because they trusted their son, Paul, and because 
he had requested them to do it and they have a love for their son, Paul, and for 
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that reason decided to do it." (Tr. 108:16-21) 
(h) Paul Richins claims the $10,431 only on behalf of Leo and 
Lucille Richins (Tr. 109:9-11). Plaintiffs claim it as the 1980 (Allred 
Contract) payment, "BUT IT WAS TO BE DETERMINED AT THE END OF THE LAWSUIT, AND 
THIS COURT BELIEVES WHAT THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT WAS AFTER A TRIAL ON THE 
MERITS, WHAT THEY WOULD FIND OUT BY IT, WHO OWNED IT." (Tr. 109:11-16) "The 
Court can't find that Paul Richins personally had an obligation to pay that 
$10,431 to the Court. Obviously, Leo Richins didn't have an obligation to pay 
$10,431 to the Court (which he did, in fact, do anyway), but THE FACT THAT HE 
DID PAY IT ON THE ORDER OF THE COURT DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT AUTOMATICALLY BELONGS 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS." (Tr. 109:16-21) 
(i) Paul Richins used the (December 15, 1980, payment of) $10,431 
"on behalf of the corporation, Richtron", and "spent it for attorney's fees and 
other things." (Tr. 109:24-25; 110:1) 
(j) "RICHTRON obviously owes that $10,431." (Tr. 110:2) "The 
Court believes that RICHTRON (not Paul Richins) owes that money. RICHTRON 
received the $10,431 and RICHTRON owes it." (Tr. 110:5-7) "RICHTRON is the one 
who owes the debt." (Tr. 110:14-15) "I said they (the Richinses) own it. I 
said it was theirs." (Tr. 116:13-14) 
(k) The fact that Leo Richins paid in the $10,431 is NOT the same 
thing as Richtron paying the payment (Tr. 110:2-5). 
(1) In December, 1982, (pursuant to an IRS Tax Sale), the IRS 
sold to Milton Goff, as trustee for others, all of the interests of Richtron (in 
the Allred and Freston Contracts, among others) (Tr. 106:17-23) (R. 595). "The 
Court believes that with this settlement between those parties" (Milton Goff, 
the alleged new owner of the rights of Richtron in the Allred and Freston 
Contracts and Young Farms (R. 595)), "and the dismissal of Paul Richins from the 
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lawsuit, that the letter of credit for the $10,431 plus the interest from which 
it has been ordered should go back to the same source that it came from which 
was LEO RICHINS. So, that's going to be the ruling of the Court." (Tr. 
111:2-10) 
(m) Paul Richins doesn't have any right to the money, Leo Richins 
does, "BECAUSE WE (the Court) DREW ON LEO'S MONEY." (Tr. 111:21-25) "There's no 
way that Paul Richins could have drawn on the letter of credit. Others could 
have, but not Paul." (Tr. 112:6-8) 
28. At said Evidentiary Hearing, Plaintiffs did NOT introduced any 
documentary evidence or testimony that the $10,431 belongs to Appellants or 
anyone other than Leo Richins, and nothing to refute the testimony of Paul, Leo 
and Lucille Richins (Entire Tr.). There is no sworn statement in the Record 
wherein Plantiffs even claim they own or have a right to the money. 
29. At said Evidentiary Hearing, the only documentary evidence or 
significant testimony introduced by Plaintiffs was that Young Farms had paid 
RICHTRON (not Paul Richins personally) enough cash in order for RICHTRON to make 
the November 15, 1980, payment on the Allred Contract, but that RICHTRON (not 
Paul Richins personally) had picked up the money from the Bank and applied it 
for attorney's fees for RICHTRON. 
30. At said Evidentiary Hearing, Plaintiffs introduced No documentary 
evidence or testimony that Paul Richins (a dismissed party) or Leo Richins (a 
non-party) should be personally liable for and be required to pay the corporate 
debt, if any, of RICHTRON, (particularly when Plaintiffs' "alter-ego" claim 
against Paul Richins was previously dismissed on Plaintiffs' own initiative and 
Leo Richins was not a party. (Entire Tr.). 
31. At said Evidentiary Hearing, Plaintiffs did NOT introduce, and 
Richtron and Paul Richins were NOT permitted to introduce, any testimony or 
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documentary evidence reflecting a proper and complete ACCOUNTING between the 
parties with a balance struck of ALL debits and credits between Richtron and 
Young Farms (which would have disclosed a substantial liability of Young Farms 
to Richtron of at least $75,000, but for which Richtron has been unable to 
collect) (Entire Tr.). 
32. At said Evidentiary Hearing, Plaintiffs did NOT 
introduce any evidence that Richtron had defaulted under the Richtron/Young 
Farms Contract, thus giving rise to a claim by Young Farms for specific 
performance. Nor was any evidence introduced proving that any Limited Partner 
had an interest in such contract or any right to alleged damages under it. 
33. On February 1, 1984, notwithstanding said DISMISSAL three months 
before, the District Court entered its "Findings of Fact and Ruling" respecting 
the Evidentiary Hearing conducted AFTER said dismissal and entry of the "Order" 
(R. 662). Said instrument was submitted by Plaintiffs and NOT served on 
Richtron, or Paul Richins or Leo Richins whose interests where materially 
affected adversely, but rather served on attorneys for other Defendants (R. 
665). The District Court did NOT enter any final order or judgment respecting 
the matter after the Evidentiary Hearing. 
34. Richtron is the court decreed, liquidating general partner of 
Young Farms, and Richtron has NOT acted on behalf of or authorized Young Farms 
to bring this Appeal (R. par. 12, 523). 
35. On December 29, 1981, Richtron retired and withdrew as general 
partner of Young Farms, thus effectively dissolving Young Farms (R. 530). 
36. The Limited Partners of Young Farms have continued the business 
of Young Farms after dissolution and without an accounting, a winding up, and 




The Lower Court's "Findings of Fact and Ruling" and 
"Order" are NOT Final Orders and Judgments 
and are NOT Appealable 
Appellants have appealed for the Lower Court (i) an "Order", entered 
January 9, 1984, and (ii) the "Findings of Fact and Ruling", entered February 1, 
1984. Rule 72(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that: 
"An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from all FINAL ORDERS 
and JUDGMENTS in accordance with their rules; ...." 
The Lower Court's "Findings of Fact and Ruling" (R. 662-665) is NOT a 
FINAL ORDER or JUDGMENT. A "ruling" is a judical or administrative 
interpretation of a provision of a statute, order, regulation or ordinance, and 
certainly not a final order or a judgment. The "Findings of Fact and Ruling" 
DOES NOT ORDER, ADJUDGE OR DECREE ANYTHING. The Supreme Court lacks jurdiction 
to consider an appeal respecting the "Findings of Fact and Ruling". 
The "Order" is not a FINAL ORDER or JUDGMENT either. Although on its 
face it states it is an order, a review of it clearly shows that IT DOES NOT 
ORDER, ADJUDGE, OR DECREE anything either, and does NOT have even the first 
essential requisite of a judgment. Under Rule 54(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a "judgment" is defined as: 
"(a) Definition; Form. "Judgment" as used in these Rules includes 
a decree and any order from which an appeal lies..." 
In re: ELLINWOOD vs. BENNION, 73 U. 563, 267 P. 159, the Utah Supreme 
Court found: 
"No particular form or words was essential to constitute a judgment, 
provided they were such as to indicate with reasonable certainty a 
final determination of the rights of the parties and the relief 
granted or denied. But in order that the document be a judgment it 
had to be sufficiently definite and certain as to be susceptible of 
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enforcement; it had to specify the relief granted or denied; it had to 
determine the right of the parties, and describe the parties for or 
against whom it was rendered. IF IT DID NOT ORDER, ADJUDGE, OR DECREE 
ANYTHING, IT HAD NOT EVEN THE FIRST ESSENTIAL REQUISITE OF A JUDGMENT. 
The "Order", was entered as a result of Plaintiffs" motion for the 
Lower Court to modify its previous Ruling, entered December 8, 1983, by deleting 
the following wording from it: 
"It the defendants dismiss the appeal then it would appear proper to 
return the $10,431 to Leo Richins. As long as the appeal remains in 
process, the amount should remain with the clerk of the court." 
Said Motion did NOT seek an ORDER, ADJUDICATION or DECREE of anything, 
nor was the Motion supported by any sworn statements as to Plaintiffs right to 
the $10,431. Such motion was denied. 
In re: COX vs. DIXIE PCWER CO., 81 U. 94, 16 P. 2nd 916, the Utah 
Supreme court found: 
"Order was decision of a motion, while judgment was decision of 
trial." 
There was NO "trial on the merits" in this case PRIOR to entry of the 
"Order". There is NO sworn statement anywhere in the Record wherein Plaintiffs 
claim a right to the $10,431. Certainly FINAL orders and judgments cannot be 
entered without at least some kind of sworn statements or testimony or 
documentary evidence to fully adjudicate the matter. The Record evidences that 
NONE of these essential elements existed before entry of the "Order". In re: 
KENNEDY VS. NEW ERA INDUSTRIES, INC., AND M.S. ROSENBERG, ET AL., U. 600 P. 2nd 
534, the Utah Supreme Court held in SCHURTZ vs. THORLEY 90 Utah at 384, 61 P. 
2nd at 1264, quoting NORTH POINT CONSOLIDATED IRRIG. CO. vs. UTAH AND SALT LAKE 
CANAL CO., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824 that: 
"A JUDGMENT TO BE FINAL MUST DISPOSE OF THE CASE AS TO ALL THE PARTIES 
AND FINALLY DISPOSE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LITIGATION ON THE 
MERITS OF THE CASE." 
Such "Order" cannot possibly dispose of the case because it had 
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already been disposed of, i.e., the case had been dismissed against Richtron and 
Paul Richins TWO MONTHS before. The "Order" could not have possibly disposed of 
the subject matter on the merits of the case because the Evidentiary Hearing was 
not only conducted AFTER the case was dismissed against Richtron and Paul 
Richins, but AFTER entry of the "Order". The "Order" simply is NOT a final 
order or judgment from which an appeal may lie. In further re: OLDROYD vs. 
McCREA, 65 U. 142, 235 P. 580, 40 A.L.R. 230: 
"Judgment to be final for purposes of appeal had to dispose of case as 
to all parties and finally DISPOSE OF SUBJECT MATTER OF LITIGATION ON 
MERITS, or be a termination of particular proceeding or action." 
In further re: WINNOVICH vs. EMERY, 33 U. 345, 93 P. 988; BRISTOL vs. 
BRENT, 35 U. 213, 99 P. 1000: 
"Test of finality for purpose of appeal was not necessarily whether 
whole matter involved in action was concluded, but whether particular 
proceeding or action was terminated by judgment." 
Clearly, the "Order" did NOT terminate the proceeding or action 
because the case had already been dismissed against Richtron and Paul Richins, 
and something cannot be terminated that no longer exists. The "Order" simply is 
not a FINAL ORDER or JUDGMENT, and, therefore, NOT appealable. 
Furthermore, the "Order" precedes the "Findings of Fact and Ruling". 
The "Order" was entered on January 9, 1984, actually 2 days before it was signed 
on January 11, 1984. The Evidentiary Hearing was later held on January 12, 
1984. The "Findings of Fact and Ruling" were then entered after the Evidentiary 
Hearing on February 1, 1984. The "Order" cannot, therefore, be supported by the 
"Findings of Fact and Ruling" and the "Order" has NO validity in equity or law. 
In re: REICH vs. REBELLION SILVER MIN. CO., 3 U. 254, 2 P. 703: 
"Written findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated, 
had to be made and filed before any judgment could be entered. They 
were the foundations of the judgment and were as necessary to precede 
any judgment as a verdict in case of a trial by jury. There was no 
presumption in the absence of findings." 
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In re: FISHER vs. EMERSON, 15 U. 517, 50 P. 619; BILLINGS vs. 
PARSONS, 17 U. 22, 53 P. 730: 
"Making and filing of findings and conclusions was part, and had to 
precede entry, of judgment." 
In re: HOLM vs. HOLM, 44 U. 242, 139 P. 937: 
"Court could not properly proceed to judgment until findings were made 
on all issues." 
In further re: THOMPSON'S ESTATE, 72 U. 17, 269 P. 103: 
"Statutory requirement of findings was just as essential in equity as 
in a law case. A judgment rendered on no findings or upon insufficient 
or improper findings had no more validity in equity than at law." 
ARGUMENT II 
Appellant, Young Farms, has NO right 
to file or maintain this Appeal 
Young Farms was organized under the Utah Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act ("Act"), as a limited partnership, of which Richtron was designated as sole 
general partner. Plaintiffs, Limited Partners, are the limited partners. A 
certificate of "Limited Partnership Agreement of Young Farms, Ltd." 
("Certificate") was filed in the office of the Davis County Clerk, Utah, under 
Section 48-2-2 of the Act. Pursuant to Section 48-2-1, of the Act, and 
paragraph 1, Article V, of the Certificate, Richtron had the exclusive right to 
initiate and maintain lawsuits on behalf of Young Farms, and the Limited 
Partners and their counselors at law are NOT entitled to act for Young Farms in 
any respect including this Appeal. 
On December 29, 1980, due to certain Limited Partners1 and their 
lawyer's continual interference in management and purchases of and attempts to 
purchase interests absolutely and unequivocably adverse to Richtron in an 
attempt to deprive Richtron of its assets, Richtron withdrew from and retired as 
general partner of Young Farms by filing a "Notice of Withdrawal" with the Davis 
County Clerk on January 7, 1981 (R. 530), and by serving written notice of such 
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Certificate, which states: 
"The General Partner (Richtron) may at any time WITHDRAW from the 
- rship, sell, or assign all or any part of its interest as a 
. Partner to a qualified party, by giving Notice to all the 
- --a Partners, and such action shall be effective upon the receipt 
z>y trie last Partner of such notice of WITHDRAWAL, sale or assignment." 
i :r\t-^i Partners consented t-'; s-:-^ • ^ -.irerent, No Limited Partner 
objected v e r b a _ ^ ^i ., *; . !ng, nor does ^ ,. ...jence ai Q obli gal ::i 01 i il ,c: 
such retirement . Paragraph 6, Article VII, of the Certificate states: 
* ^ . :.;.£ event that the General Partner desires to take any act] on 
which is subject to the consent of the Limited Partners, the General 
- r shall give each Limited Partner notice of the proposed action, 
crach Limited Partner shall be deemed to have consented to such 
.on unless the General Partner receives an objection from such 
Limited Partner within 14 days from the date on which notice was 
mailed." 
Upon such retirement, Young Farms dissolved with the express written 
consent of the Limited Partners, pursuant to Ar'ticle VII of the Certificate, 
which states: 
"The Partnership shall terminate (dissolve) twenty (20) years from the 
date of this Agreement or upon the prior occurrence of any of the 
following events: 
a .,c v,. JHDRAWAL, dissolution or :.ankruptci of tl le Gei leral Par ti ier" 
A "Notice of Dissolution and Discontinuance of Limited Partnership" 
-- * •" "s * " ': " r:rr>: 'inua:' * :> * P. - "Notice 
i ^di.jciiat^^i, -l v.a;iL;aiv. oi L ^ m ^ e c Par- .AOa.^;_.r ^„ ioung .-arms, _ ,." was 
filed on May 2&, 19cl iK. 5»1>. :,oer Section 48-^-2^ • r the AJI., tn«-
"Effect of retirement, oeaui or insanity of a gene . •-. — 
The retirement... .of a general partner dissolves u ^ ™ ^ j : , , . r , 
unless the business is continued by the remaining general partners: 
\i -.1 z% L-.yuL tv ^ uu ccaued in thi1 i:ort il i <"at *'; i.r, 
(D/ n i j i the consent of ALL members." 
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Upon such retirement, there was NO remaining general partner of Young 
Farms; there is NO right given in the Certificate providing for a continuance or 
renewal of the business of Young Farms solely by or at the will of the Limited 
Partners upon the retirement of Richtron as the sole general partner; and there 
is NO provision under the Act entitling the Limited Partners to so continue or 
renew the business absent an express provision under the Certificate otherwise. 
Upon such retirement, Richtron (still a member of Young Farms), did NOT give 
consent to a continuance or renewal of the business of Young Farms solely by the 
Limited Partners and their non-member agent — Tower. 
Immediately after such retirement, the Limited Partners attempted to 
elect John P. Sampson, Esq, (who was Richtron1s and Young Farms1 legal counsel) 
as substitute general partner of Young Farms, and attempted to continue Young 
Farms as if no dissolution had occurred (R. 527-529). Richtron quickly 
resisted. Although it had retired, it was still the stipulated liquidating 
general partner under the Certificate. NO amendment to the Certificate had been 
duly executed, acknowledged and filed as required under paragraphs 9 and 11 of 
the Certificate and Sections 48-2-24 and 48-2-25 of the Act removing Richtron or 
authorizing Tower's admittance and a continuance. 
Later, on July 1, 1981, Tower, then attempting to act as general 
partner of Young Farms, and the Limited Partners executed and filed what at 
first glance appears to be an amendment to the Certificate (R. 551-582). 
However, on close examination, the alleged amendment is totally invalid for two 
reasons: (i) it does not bear the signature of Richtron, as a member of Young 
Farms and a party to the Certificate as required under Section 48-2-25(1)(b) of 
the Act, and (ii) the alleged amendment was NOT executed by Richtron on its own 
behalf and for each Limited Partner. Paragraph 9 of the Certificate (R. 539) 
specifically provides that the written consent of Richtron is required to amend 
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the Certificate: 
^n±is Agreement may be amended, from time to time, with the WRITTEN 
>ENT OF THE GENERAL PARTNER (Richtron) and all of the Limited 
;u;:.ner?." 
Paragraph 11 of the Certificate •. >40. specifically provides that 
R:i cht .roi 1 l >«< :' t 1 ^  r R R E V O C A B L E i::i gl: li 1 i • e * = <: ] ] amendments to the 
Certificate as attorney for each Limited Partner: 
1111. Each Limited Partner by the execution of this Agreement or a 
counterpart of this Agreement does IRREVOCABLY constitute and appoint 
the General Partner (Richtron) his true and lawful attorney in his 
name, place and stead, to execute, acknowledge, deliver, file and 
record in the appropriate public offices (a) all certificates and 
~
L
~er instruments (including counterparts of this Agreement) which the 
i: .oral Partner (Richtron) deems appropriate to qualify or CONTINUE 
the Partnership as a limited partnership (or a partnership in which 
special partners have limited liability) in the jurisdictions in which 
the Partnership may conduct business; (b) all instruments which the 
General Partner (Richtron) deems appropriate to reflect a CHANGE or 
MODIFICATION of the Partnership in accordance with the terms of the 
Agreement; and (c) all conveyances and other instruments which the 
General Partner (Richtron) deems appropriate to reflect this 
dissolution and termination of the Partnership. THE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
GRANTED HEREIN SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE COUPLED WITH AN INTEREST and 
shall survive the death or incompetency of a Limited Partner and the 
assignment by a Limited Partner of his Partnership interest." 
Section 48-2-24(2)(d) and (e) specifically provides under what 
"(2) A certificate shall be amended when: 
(d) A person is admitted as a general partner; 
(e) A general partner RETIRES, dies, or becomes insane, and the 
business is CONTINUED under section 48-2-20;" 
Section 48-2-25(1)(b) also specifically provides that all members 
( .r.rlvAira Rieh^rcr' rhal'l sign an amendment to the Certificate, subject,- of 
-: . . ..• s -- - ;- *-- -of • attorn - - . *:rc i I t :> sigi I i t f : r i !is . 
Limited Partners: 
" -- writing to amend a certificate shall: 
(. i^ signed and sworn to by ail jnenioei^ . 
On page 10 of Appellants1 Brief, Appellants admit z^ exactly who 
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executed and filed the alleged amendment: 
"All of the LIMITED PARTNERS got together and amended the Articles of 
the Limited Partnership Agreement on the 12th day of February, 1981, 
which Amended Articles were filed July, 1, 1981 and which Amended 
Articles provided that Tower Real Estate, a Utah corporation, would 
be the general partner. THESE AMENDED ARTICLES WERE SIGNED BY ALL OF 
THE LIMITED PARTNERS". 
However, under the provisions of the Act and the Certificate as cited 
above, the ONLY person (partner) empowered to execute, deliver and file an 
amendment to the Certificate is RICHTRON! The Limited Partners and Tower had NO 
authority whatsoever to execute, deliver and file the alleged amendment, and any 
such alleged "Amended Articles" removing Richtron and admitting Tower as general 
partner and continuing Young Farms, are FATALLY DEFECTIVE, absent proper 
execution by Richtron for itself and all Limited Partners. 
On page 10 of Appellants1 Brief, Appellants cite paragraph 6, Article 
VI, of the Certificate as their authority to remove the present general partner 
(Richtron) and elect a new general partner (Tower). Tower, which was NOT a 
member of Young Farms or a party to the Certificate, then executed the alleged 
amendment, just as if it were already a member duly admitted as substitute 
general partner, to remove Richtron and admit Tower as general partner. 
However, Richtron had by then already withdrawn and retired, with the written 
consent of the Limited Partners, and, therefore, Richtron couldnft possibly be 
removed, nor were the removal provisions of the Certificate then applicable. 
As shown below, this issue was fully adjudicated in another case involving 
similar issues in favor of Richtron. 
As demonstrated above, RICHTRON is the only IRREVOCABLY authorized 
member to execute and file with the Davis County Clerk an amendment to the 
Certificate on behalf of ALL partners, general or limited. And RICHTRON has Not 
authorized, executed or filed one! Only a general partner (not a limited 
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partner'- *\ac th* -:r:V t.c orosecute or appeal matters on behalf of a limi ted 
partnersmj . ^BL;<^:i - . . ATLANTIC MUTUAI INSURANCE CQMPAN 1 , ib!» P, 
53, 62 Washington 2d. 922: 
"Requirement for joinder of all partners in an action upon a partner-
asset does not apply to limited partnerships, and in the case of 
a limited partnership ONLY THE GENERAL PARTNER .MAY INSTITUTE A SUIT ON 
ITS BEHALF.n 
"Limited partners lacked capacity to maintain an action to recover 
amount allegedly due under a fire policy issued by defendant insurers 
on a partnership asset, but such action could be maintained ONLY by 
general partner of the limited partnership.11 
In re: FC>: •/ . SACKMAN, 591 P. 2d, b-^ t2 Washington App. 707: 
"Oi JI ] y geneic^. .t» ,:. xii..iLtiu pcn-iitntjiiii- n. auLiurized to bring 
ac Lion on Deru. ±. ^±. the limited partnership under real party in 
interest rule.n 
"Sole general partner of limited partnership which purchased property 
from general partner in his individual capacity was real party ii : 
interest and therefore authorized to commence quiet title action.11 
I: is NOT the ngh- : --; y cf the Limited Partners of a Utat ...united 
.-., ar.u
 ±ii zhe :,ame oi. Cm -.in.: .t^ ; partnership -.^-Uuii.g Young Farms. 
On March 10, 1981 , the Limited Partners of Young Farms, through its 
#29700/ against Richtron anc Paul Richins. Or; November 4, 19b.., the L-nuLec 
Partners, through the other alleged substitute general partner, John P. Sampson, 
Patj Richins, among ochers, in ihe Second Judicia. Di.-*r;.ct C^ur*. (Case #30994) 
involvi ng substantial ly the same i ssues as those filed earlier n Case #2^700. 
BotI i lawsuits were sin ailtai leously .i*-a. ,« I-H=L .:- .. *&. .<_ >±£\.L -. .: ge, j 
Duffy Palmer, until later transferee : •> Jucge Corriaby ^\ December, 1982. 
During the pendency of the lawsuiL .:.>_ v^ ase #30994, Young Farms was 
NOT dismissed from the case as a party-plaint-it, notwithstanding the Limited 
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Partners and Tower, the other alleged substitute general partner, had filed a 
lawsuit under Case #29700 eight months before and WERE AWARE OF THE SECOND 
LAWSUIT. Appellants suggest in their Brief that they were not aware of Case 
#30994. This is hard to believe in that the limited partners of Young Farms 
gave John P. Sampsom their Limited Powers of Attorney to vote their partnership 
interests, admit him as general partner (R. 529), then sue Richtron and Paul 
Richins, which they subsequently did (R. 541). And both cases were being heard 
before the same Judge in Department #2. (The Limited Partners would obviously 
see which lawsuit produced the best results for them). 
On November 24, 1982, Richtron sought a Summary Judgment in Case 
#30994 seeking a determination of Richtron's authority to liquidate, wind up and 
terminate Young Farms and other similarly controlled limited partnerships, and 
the authority, if any, of ALL other alleged substitute general partners to act 
on behalf of Young Farms or other partnerships. On November 24, 1982, in Case 
#30994, Judge Palmer, who was simultaneously hearing Case #29700, entered an 
"Order Respecting Summary Judgment and Judgment of Dismissal Without Prejudice", 
which was never appealed by Young Farms or the limited partners (R. 548). 
The aforesaid Order and Judgment fully adjudicated once and for all 
the authority of Tower, John P. Sampson, a Professional Corporation, or any 
other person or entity other than Richtron to act on behalf of Young Farms. 
Tower has never been duly admitted as substitute general partner of Young Farms 
(which matter was fully adjudicated in the said Order and Judgment on November 
24, 1982, in Case #30994), and, therefore, is NOT now, nor was it then, entitled 
to notice of any pleadings or actions whatsoever respecting Young Farms. 
Richtron is the exclusive, stipulated, court decreed, liquidating general 
partner of Young Farms. 
On page 10 of Appellants1 Brief, Appellants would like this Court to 
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oeneve m a t trie issut UI. Kiamon • L. ut rowa . dim tiui 11 v cu yeiiuidi pdiint*i was 
somehow l a t e r reconsidered by another Judge who again adjudicated the sane issue 
j
 - 3. jjLcier" d a r r i Mav •* s; - ^. - ± 4 6 ) . Judge Cornaby i s T-' v 
appe^ani Ju^gc- over Juc^ . _^..i-_., ..... ^ u.. ne override J udge Palmer's ,.•:* .._^s 
Order and Judgment. Also, • ne granting of :,h*. Partial Summary Judgment 
txhiLt. of iv-u. - F'arnt to lee , . ,tr iacl .. , r Wv_ .^jueo hu,. absolutely 
nothing to do wi th one another. Appellants claim, in snr\ Brier * ha4 ; Q . 
R:i " i . «. - a i • * .ur- ./ - "1 ' ' ' ' " -f4' - " 
Cour- \. 521-5B2J. Howevei
 f a cursory review ^i une Record absolutely ai id 
unecrui'rocablv ?h°ws *~hat" *~^c- ^pnp ->f author!4-^ or Tower \< C'*'>,v^ vr:mn Farms 
o r . ^ '-_.-_... ..i . , • . .^t.t:-. .^.,s 
adjudicates . .j . ^re-trial Oroer or the Partial Sumrrary JucgnenL, or at any 
ot";e" " r ?- s ^ > / . Wutw;* hstar.dinc R:chrr';n mac a :?:? _ar motion to 
dismiss ii i Caso s^y
 t.\ because ot luwti'^ . ^. ,1 auti.^i^y o ;t; ;.:.•- .^^ . was 
dismissed 9 days afuer such Motion was filed. It. was N* -': hear a noi was orie 
:i ssue adjudicc ** - • "> * •> • -. . •-* - -: w-v-- -'r -sue 
of Richtron's a^m^i^Lv
 L. aoi ISL Young Farnis \ac granted unoc. sdx^ ^ .>. ,,nd 
Judgment in Case #30994) was, nonetheless, conclusive. Such issue is identical 
w :i th tl: le issue respect ii lg other par tnerships effected 1: ;  > sai d Or filer and 
Judgment, This is precisely why JUDGE 'PALMER MADE NO EXCEPTION FOR YOUNG FARMS 
AND RIGHTRON'S RIGHT TO CONTROL IT and decreed accordingly. 
On February £TER R:i chtr : n was dismissed from tl i€ cas = 
Judge Cornaby entered the aforesaid Pre-trial Order in which Appellant claimed 
Tower A'3:- "recognized" ar AhC' ^ o-^-a-i oar^ner c-i i Ore;—: was prepared by 
.^a^^Li'.o a. A, •_—_:_* V*-.L:. ,.I n.u..v. i .\-.c:/.i _.., A:.. : . o„:,roi I was NOT a par ty 
to or affected by It because Richtron had been dismissed from the case. It has 
- 31 -
NO affect on Richtron's previously decreed rights to control Young Farms, Any 
reference to Tower as the general partner of Young Farms and Joseph S. Knowlton 
as counsel for Young Farms was NOT ORDERED, ADJUDGED OR DECREED by the District 
Court, nor could it be. THE MATTER IS RES JUDICATA! 
Appellants1 Appeal invokes the doctrine of RES JUDICATA. The 
authority of Richtron or anyone else (including Tower) to control Young Farms 
has been fully adjudicated in Case #30994 without appeal. Intervenor is 
entitled to rely upon the decreed rights of Richtron in this Appeal, and 
Appellants are governed thereby as well. The Record does NOT reflect any 
assignment of those rights to Tower, including the right to bring this Appeal 
for Young Farms. 
Richtron General has been granted the EXCLUSIVE RIGHT, pursuant to 
Sections 42-2-7 through 11, inclusive, U.C.A., 1953, amended, to carry on, 
conduct and/or transact business in the State of Utah under the assumed name of 
"Young Farms, Ltd." for a 5 year term from April 28, 1982, to April 28, 1987. 
The Record does NOT reflect where Richtron General has assigned to Tower, or the 
Limited Partners, its right to conduct this Appeal under the assumed name of 
"Young Farms, Ltd." 
RICHTRON is, therefore, the absolute, court decreed, liquidating 
general partner of Young Farms. RICHTRON IS the ONLY party (partner) authorized 
to initiate or maintain this Appeal on behalf of Young Farms; and Richtron has 
NOT authorized this Appeal. If the Supreme Court were to determine that the 
$10,431 belongs to Young Farms, the Lower Court would then have to return it to 
RICHTRON as the only authorized person to liquidated the affairs of Young Farms. 
ARGUMENT III 
Richtron and Paul Richins cannot be Bound 
by Decisions of the District Court 
in a Case for which They are 
no longer Parties 
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Richins .: \ November 9, i98:, under v;he "Partial Summary Judgment '\ Ar apjea- .>r 
"
,r,h Judgment war filf-r. -y 'arua-- •^' Ra°e-" ^r. ~u~ representation.'- :=t 
., aagt. .  . L .a ; ..;' •. -• -. _*.cu •. :•,
 f :;. •-• ..••-. r^ -. ,. 
such other appeal was dismissed, such other appeal, was withdrawn on January 3, 
-o.;^ :.. -r ~
 / v • : ~- remitted to the District court. From that cc" : , 
I ^ C U L L ^ aiiu P a _ ,_ji;iiio were NOT parties to the case, Nevertheless, u.e 
"Order" was entered on Janaary 12, 1964, which affected the $10,431 deposited by 
I « e < : : .. • ~' -' - — • ; -• - ; . - -v « '.-•>- - - = •. b e 
bound by any decision of the District Court made after such case and other 
appeal were dismissed becajse they were net partie-. r^ Evidentiary Hearing was 
.a c; . •; . . ... **;. . -.-=! opportune ty t .c be 
heard because they were no longer parties. 46 Am. Jur (2) paragraph 18, I , .-~4 
providesi 
"It is a fundamental doctrine of the law that a party to be affected 
by a personal judgment must have a day in Court or an onoortunity to 
be heard." 
""•- ' -* • vri ^''---r&c-c. - 1 .he Utah Supreme C-": * " 3MITEM ?"s, 
MORRIS 3 J 4 P. 2:IC 56 , -. J ... .^. JJJ: 
"It. x£ :)f course ar: elementary rule of law that there can be no 
judicial action affecting vested rights that is not based upon some 
process or notice whereby the interested parties are brought with the 
jurisdiction of the judicial tribunal about to render judgment." 
could do w^Ln L:,e ^ ' J ^ J - aiLci i:^ case agaxiiJi rvichirui. anu Paux Rj.cniii^ and 
such other appeal were dismissed, was to release the money to Leo Richins, "the 
source from whi d I i i • :::ai n e " T h e l):i strict: Colli:: I errored :i i I 1: leari i lg ai : .d 
determining the matter further, and particularly errored in retaining the money 
until Plaintiffs went through the appeal process. 
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ARGUMENT IV 
Neither Young Farms nor the Limited Partners have a Right 
to an Award of the $10,431 because there is NO breach 
of Contract, there has been NO proper or complete 
Accounting, and the Limited Partners have NO 
Interest in the Limited Partnership's Assets 
There is NO affidavit, testimony or documentary evidence in the Record 
proving that Richtron defaulted under the Richtron/Young Farms Contract. Under 
the terms of such Contract (Exhibit B), the only material obligation imposed on 
Richtron is to deliver a good and sufficient warranty deed and a policy of title 
insurance upon Young Farms1 payment in full of the purchase price. If Richtron 
could not deliver a deed, Young Farms (not the Limited Partners who were not 
parties to such Contract) would then have an action for specific performance, 
but only then. There is NO evidence that Richtron could not have delivered a 
warranty deed and title insurance upon payment. Richtron made the November 15, 
1980, payment on the Allred Contract within the grace period on February 20, 
1980. The $10,431 stayed in the Bank until Richtron withdrew it on December 7, 
1981. It should be noted that when Young Farms made its 1980, payment of 
$32,396 to Richtron under the Richtron/Young Farms Contract, that money then 
belonged to Richtron. Young Farms thereafter had NO right to or interest in any 
part of the it. Richtron replaced "its11 money with a written tender of payment 
on December 7, 1981 (R. 644), because Young Farms had not paid their November 
15, 1981, payment of $32,396 to Richtron (R. 641). E*y that time, the Limited 
Partners, acting under the guise of Young Farms, had USED RICHTRONfS OWN ASSETS 
UNDER THE FRESTON PROPERTY to deed around Richtron, therein by-passing the 
rights and interests of Richtron in said property (R. 258-273). In this manner, 
the Limited Partners obtained "warranty deeds" conveying such property directly 
to them from the Frestons and Youngs without paying Richtron what was owed. The 
Record also reflects that the Limited Partners were negotiating directly with 
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Allreds1 lawyer to purchase Allreds" rights and squeeze Richtron from that end 
iuung raiiUo Lechi.i^ axly >id^  NO legal ciLxe to * nt A^.ed Property, 
bo C.J.b Sect I T 4" 5 pmv ne.---
1Firin Property. .~iJ.~UUUMII it 
property is vested in the limits . - . .p as such, there is 
authority that the legal title to aii trie i . r:- property should o e 
vested in the general partner." 
Furthermore, no Limited partner has a direct property right in the 
A3 lred Con1 ract c 1,r Pr^r>erty,, and, therefore , cannc 1 di recti y succeed to any 
monies wi^n respecu \ , 68 C.J.S. Section 4 71 ,c, provides: 
"The Special Partners, Nature of Interest in Firm: A special partner 
:i s not a creditor of the firm, and although he may, in a sense, be 
• t .sidered as an owner, HE HAS NO PROPERTY RIGHT IN THE FIRM'S 
i SSETS." 
Oi I pa g :' ] 2 : -f Ap pel 1 ai 11 :sf Bri ef, Appel I ants c] aim tl lal :: 
"If there was any failure in regard to the Amendment, then the LIMITED 
PARTNERS f all of who are plaintiffs and appellants in this action, 
WOULD HAVE ALL OF THE RIGHTS AND PROPERTIES OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
ACCRUE TO THEM and they would be the proper parties to bring an action 
to determine the property rights and accounting against the former 
-ral partner who had withdrawn." 
ild be i i Dted ti lat tl ie • ::lairi t f : r ai I accounting brought by the 
Limited Partners (whether they now have the rights of a general or limited 
partner) was dismissed on their initiative. The above language suggests that 
each Limited Partner has automatically succeeded to all the rights and interests 
in the Allred Contract and Property as would a general partner c:\ a general 
partnershi p. Nc t :w:i thstandj ng t .hey i nva] i dJ y execi ited and fi'-•• =• •"-] ] eged 
amendment to the Certificate and continued and renewed the partnership, the 
Limited Partners do NOT have any greater right now than the Certificate and the 
I : 1 :i nii tr:vr!" -r-ve them 68 C J S S< *ct -63 pr J\ n des •: 
ect Of Failure To Comply With Statutes... Although there is 
«u^iiority that as a result of such failure to satisfy the statutes tl: ie 
firm is a general partnership for all purposes, there is other 
:*r> -
authority that the firm is such a general partnership only as to its 
relation to third persons; that the firm in for, is a limited 
partnership, subject to all the rules applicable to such partnerships; 
THAT AS BETWEEN THE PARTNERS THEY ARE BOUND BY THEIR AGREEMENT; AND 
THAT ALL THE SPECIAL PARTNERS' RELATIONS TO HIS CO-PARTNERS AND THEIR 
OBLIGATIONS TO HIM GROWING OUT OF THE RELATION REMAIN UNIMPAIRED." 
Plaintiffs' comments above also suggest that a limited partner can 
acquire the rights and interests in property as would a general partner by 
simply attempting to take control of and invalidly continue a limited 
partnership, acquire rights in a co-partners' property adverse to the 
co-partner, deed around the co-partner's and limited partnership's interests and 
attempt to expel the already retired co-partner when who trys to stop it. Also, 
by so doing, a limited partner can convert his personal property interest in the 
limited partnership to a real property ownership interest in the partnership's 
or the co-partner's real property. This is ludicrous. The rights of the 
Limited Partners are set forth in Section 48-2-10 of the Act, which provides: 
"Rights of a limited partner.— (1) A limited partner shall have the 
same rights as a general partner to: 
(a) Have the partnership books kept at the principal place of 
business of the partnership, and at all times to inspect and copy 
any of them; 
(b) Have on demand true and full information of all things affecting 
the partnership, and a formal account of partnership affairs 
whenever circumstances render it just and reasonable; and 
(c) Have dissolution and winding up by decree of court. 
(2) A limited partner shall have the right to receive a share of the 
profits or other compensation by way of income, and to the return of 
his contribution as provided in sections 48-2-15 and 48-2-16." 
This doctrine was reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in WESTLEY G. 
HARLINE and RICHARD NILSON vs. LCWELL R. DAINES, et al., 567 Pac. Rep., 2nd p. 
1120, Utah, 1977: 
"...The rights of a limited partner are set forth in Section 48-2-10, 
U.C.A., 1953. There is nothing there that confers on limited partners 
the power to interfere in the conduct of the partnership business or 
to surreptitiously devise a scheme to divert the assets from the 
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partnership so as to deprive the general partners of their interest." 
The Limited Partners .Amended Complaint was an action against their 
co-partner, Richtron, and j ts President, Paul Richins, to recover, among other 
Recoro i^ea:.t_v' <- xaeiicec nha- tnere has No1! D U * . <. . ,:.a. -;et.^ ie;:^ :.i ,: 
partnership affairs accomplished by marshaling partnership assets, ascertaining 
i "r oV: a~^ ^ r ,l targi ng II ab:i ] I ti es, whj ch : 4:" *?** • * i.] doctr: ne • :)f ~™r~v n 
.aw a:,o a condition preceding an award 01 uie ^>.:u,^i L^ Plaintiffs even ii chey 
were entitled t<~- it (which they are n o w . +„ ^ . FULTON vs. BAXTER, 59c J. 2nd 
"One general partner cannot bring an action against his co-partner to 
recover damages until a final settlement of partnership affairs was 
accomplished by marshaling partnership assets, ascertaining surplus 
and discharging liabilities." 
There was NO "1 :i::i a] : i 1 tl le mer f1 net', -.- ^ o ?ase ann nst Richtron 
and Paul Richins "was dismissed, which wouiv. nave pi.oducea a compete and proper 
accounting between the partners including at least $7b,GJ0 owed ro Richtron by 
v.: ai:/ Limited Partnei , anc e^en ±\ ^ was, LI*.- L* .itea Partners nave askea ...ie 
District Court and now the Supreme Court: • *-~ ascertain ~.Vir alleged right r • _ 
"w i 1 :!: 101 :i;il a settlemei it of par tnersl: id p affairs. 68 C J. S Sectioi 1 3 7 i ' pro\ - -
"Necessity of Settlement. Before the rights of the several partners 
in the property of the firm can be ascertained, and such property 
distributed among them, a settlement of partnership affairs must 
generally be had." 
In paraqraph 2 of Plaintiffs1 "Reply", dated April 9, 1981, to the 
ujuiiterclaim ui H.::/.:^ -.*.. r ^ . •. . . .IJL,, Plaint..;!.: adiiul. h. J ooni iiiuanoo ». 1 
Young Farms without a dissolution and settlement of partnership affairs. The 
~ . - - ' P - - • *- - ' - , - . , . . ,. .. ~~>.
 e an account with 
A^r.ii',;] auu oLau Lne udxa.^L uLirtciUi LiiL pai.i-iiei^ respecting partnership 
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affairs, which they alleged included the $10,431, notwithstanding they claimed, 
in effect, that no dissolution had occured. For if a dissolution had occured 
under the Certificate and the Act, the partnership could not have been 
continued. The District Court could not interfere to settle accounts and state 
the balance between the partners absent a dissolution which the Limited Partners 
disclaimed. 68 C.J.S. Section 377(b) provides: 
"Necessity of Dissolution. The general rule, subject to a few 
exceptions, is that a partnership accounting cannot be demanded or an 
action brought therefore, until the partnership is dissolved, unless 
Plaintiff seeks in the same action a dissolution of the partnership 
and a settlement of the partnership accounts as discussed infra 
Section 406. Also while the partnership continues, a court of equity 
will not interfer to settle accounts and state the balance between 
the partners, except where the complaining partner establishes a case 
of extreme necessity." 
Even if the $10,431 on deposit was Plaintiffs' (which the evidence and 
law clearly shows it isn't and can't be), Richtron was and is entitled to an 
accounting where the Record clearly shows that the Limited Partners and their 
agent, Tower, have sought to deed around the interests of Richtron in the 
Properties using Richtron's own assets in payment (R. 258-273), have sought to 
exclude Richtron from the firm business, and have sought to expel Richtron from 
Young Farms after it had withdrawn. 68 C.J.S. Section 377(b) provides: 
"Necessity of Dissolution. Even though there has been neither a 
dissolution nor a prayer for dissolution, the right to an accounting 
ordinarily exists where some of the partners are improperly 
withholding firm assets, or have wrongfully excluded, or sought to 
exclude, a co-partner from the firm or the firm business, or have 
sought to expel him from the co-partnership, or drive him to a 
dissolution." 
Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot possibly be entitled to the $10,431 under 
any theory, in law or in equity, because the Limited Partners have NO direct 
interest in the assets of Young Farms and there has been NO accounting and 
settlement of the affairs of Young Farms between the partners. 
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ARGUMENT i;: 
Paul Richins is NOT liable for 
Richtron Obligations,, i f am/ 
On November 15,1974, Richtron purchased the Allred Property from, the 
Yo'i ings and agree-; ~ assume the Allreri Con\ra^ 4 (L.xhm:; 
Richtron then res^ic .Jne Allred P r o p e m y m *^u;.r . a : ^ .L-Xi^m , ^t h; . . . ^ i 
organized simultaneously. Paul Richin: war N v a oarcy m any m m Contracts, 
Properties (Lxmoms A & : ^ m JJ n ^ m m - _ii record, pruvt . ^ aiiegea, 
establishing that Paul Richins had ar interest in m e nmchase r resale, _:m 
,; •- .«. . -*: . •• • f 
Richtron; that ne took me $m,4m frcir. trie BaiiK :. :, wn oemm; mat "> war 
subsequently7 soer* ~r" Km '^^ beran r* r "-ha1" ^ m^ :'* ^c Ricr*-^^^ ar hLs 
"alter-egc" m . _ m..jsm , .• m.m* - . K . -: •: : . .*,<. i 
by hir. was on behalf -f Richtron, with :he exception o£ nis personal compliance 
w r r • * ' - v-- f- • i e m s i t <T.P .<"' f ~ : m t r or. n d n ' t . Under 
Utah .a/*, w'x^ ij ^ ^ o t i a j u , m ^ j ^ ^ m ^ ~^ iv;. . .mm^ ; : a ,\.. mtron co;:pcram 
m l i g a m m ; .*, :a • r ichtron hac mo* 
ARGUMENT ^ ?I 
The $10,431 was Deposited into Court pending Determination 
of the Rights of the Parties in the Allred Contract 
and the Properties under the Contract. 
Ti>r ' - • - -
(R. 234) requires Richt-roi, ana Pau.. jxmhin^ tu deposit mj,43- m m Cuum, 
representing the 1980' payment on the Allred Contract, t. be held "PEN:,IN" THE 
DETERMINATION i'I THh KIGHTi.. Ui; "'•:" I .-.:"! :: IN THI< /V. . /:;"•. ' 
PROPERTIES UNDERLYING SAID COMHRAC; " m Allreds were not "parties" when said 
r-rde • *.-*. orm -.- Paul Richins claimed no personal interest m the Ailr^: 
Contact. m mc^mying property., nor did Plaintiffs al lege he .^ . a.
 j . .•:.-. 
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Section 48-2-18, U.C.A., 1953, amended, the Limited Partners holding a PERSONAL 
PROPERTY interest in Young Farms had no direct rights in the Allred Contract or 
underlying property, which is a REAL PROPERTY interest. The sole rights of the 
Limited Partners are defined in Section 48-2-10, U.C.A., 1953, amended and the 
limited partnership agreement. Nothing contained therein grants any Limited 
Partner a REAL PROPERTY interest in the Allred Contract, nor are the Limited 
Partners parties to the RichtronAoung Farms Contract. Section 48-2-18 
of the Act provides: 
"Nature of limited partner's interest in pc*rtnership.— A limited 
partner's interest in the partnership is personal property." 
So the only rights in the Allred Contract and the underlying property 
to be determined at "trial on the merits" were those of Richtron and Young 
Farms. Richtron had purchased the Allred Property by assumption of the Allred 
Contract from the Youngs, and had resold it at a disclosed profit to Young 
Farms, pursuant to the "Richtron/Young Farms Contract. However, the Limited 
Partners of Young Farms claimed in their Amended Complaint that such act was a 
breach of Richtron's fiduciary responsibility to Young Farms, and sought to 
rescind the "Richtron/Young Contract" and cause Richtron to hold as trustee for 
Young Farms the Allred Contract, thereby eliminating Richtron's disclosed profit 
on resale. 
Richtron never paid into Court the $10,431 as ordered. Notwithstanding 
Paul Richins was only an officer of Richtron and NOT a shareholder and claimed 
NO personal interest in the Allred Contract or Property, nevertheless, for some 
unknown reason, he personally was required to deposit $10,431 into Court if 
Richtron didn't. When Richtron didn't, he solicited and received from his 
father, Leo Richins, a Letter of Credit drawn on Barnes Banking Company in favor 
of the District Court "for the account of Leo H. Richins". Unsatisfied with the 
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Letter of Credit, Plaintiffs sought and received an Order from, the Clerk of the 
vV.un * collet rrom Barnes Banking Companv b • ,» *i i~ accordance with the 
• *... c -f Credi t ai id provi c> 
$\
 :4i. AG: "*4 - oe deposited with the ClerK ol tm. LOLII and the Clei K -.;. invest 
rhe sale •:: -: interest-bearing certificates UNTIL THE FINAL CONCLUSION OF THIS 
:,,/,:,- . . . - ) . 
At the Evidentiary Hearing held on January 12f 1984, Judge 
frv»mabyr who had been assiqned the case from Judge Palmer, interpreted both 
Orders respecting deposit ot une money to mean „nc u ^ , •. »a. be 
retained by the Court unti .  r was determined, "AFTER ;. /RIAL ON THE MERITS", 
right.,.(to it)...if it was decided cney should rt^ei.e , *. * <.-,-*. - J.ne 
Record shows there was NOT a n:r:a: .\ rhe n e r i ^ s " . rlsr*r Plaint .fff1 Amended 
Coniplai i it agaii ist R:i ct it * ^: i r - * ' 
Hearing due substantially co Young Farms1 purchase of the Allred and Freston 
Contracts from Milton F, G.t: who allegedly purchased them at an XRS Tax Sale. 
As nc -: - .... . -.._, ^ >L:.JLLS « ;,. :. . . ^ n .^ ^  :,ia. . -.. ,t .Tiber, 
1982, Milton R. Gofr, Trustee in ir-is* - allegedly purchased all . f Ricnti^n's 
i:i ght .s and :i nterer1;. ' :• j h.'. -Ilred and Freston Contracts, among others, 
(Tr. 106:1 1 '-2^; .- . January ^, 1983, Goff assigned, transfered and quit claimed 
to Young Farms all. his rights and interests in the Allred and Freston Contracts 
*--e Ai. reo C^ntra^. a:;c ,..r3 properties underly^.*g ~a... Jvr.L....,:" v. _ 
allegedly determined, and Plaintiffs had no need to proceed against Richtron and 
Pai ;i 3! R:i chi ns t D C bi :a:i i I 1 .1 :« ' " '^  :1 ai id Freston Cont .rad :s, mK^-r r°j r - p] ai nt:i ffs 
sought and received a "Pari^ai Suinmary Judgment" declaring that. K-churon had no-
interest in the Allred and Freston Properties. 
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Goff's alleged sale of Richtron's interest in the Allred Contract and 
Property to Young Farms and the subsequent "Partial Summary Judgment" (which 
allegedly decreed the right of Plaintiffs in the Properties and, in fact, 
dismissed Richtron and Paul Richins from the case) allegedly determined 
Plaintiffs1 rights thereunder. The $10,431 should have been returned at that 
point because Plaintiffs had absolutely NO cause of action for anything against 
Richtron and Paul Richins before the Court, particularly after Paul Richins 
withdrew his appeal of the "Partial Summary Judgment". How can the District 
Court thereafter hold an EVIDENTIARY HEARING on a cause of action previously 
dismissed against Richtron and Paul Richins, and particularly one where ONLY the 
Plaintiffs are allowed to present evidence and their side of the case, and Paul 
Richins is not? How can the Court enter Findings of Fact AFTER the case was 
dismissed against Richtron and Paul Richins and a Ruling respecting a dismissed 
matter? 
ARGUMENT VII 
Leo Richins Deposited the Letter of Credit on Behalf of 
Paul Richins, and NOT on behalf of Richtron 
The Record is replete with substantial documentation, affidavits, and 
the sworn testimony on THREE witness that Leo Richins provided the Letter of 
Credit, which the District Court drew on, in behalf of Paul Richins, and NOT on 
behalf of Richtron. Appellants have produced NO documentation, affidavit, or 
aworn testimony otherwise. The Letter of Credit was provided clearly for Paul 
Richins who was not adjudicated liable to Appellants for anything, and the case 
against him was dismissed. Even if Richtron were determined to be liable to 
Appellant for the $10,431, without a complete accounting and settlement of 
partnership affairs, Paul Richins clearly is NOT! 
ARGUMENT VIII 
The $10,431 on Deposit was Contributed by, is the Property 
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of, and Must be Returned to Leo Richins, 
the Source from Which it Came 
Intervenor, Leo Richins, incorporates each and every Argument above in 
this Argument VIII. What Richtron may or may not have done with the $10,431 
should NOT affect Leo Richins1 money or his ability to get it back. Appellants 
cannot, in good faith claim the money should be turned over to them because Leo 
Richins was never a party and Paul Richins is not a party. If Appellants 
believe they are entitled to the money, they had their chance to try the issue 
on the merits. They chose to dismiss their Amended Complaint against Richtron 
and Paul Richins and get them out of the case without a trial. But when Paul 
Richins requested the money from the Court on behalf of Leo Richins, then 
Appellants decided they wanted a "trial" after all, but without any opposition. 
The money was 
to be put with the District Court until the case was concluded. The findings of 
the District Court that the money belongs to Leo Richins must be affirmed and 
and the money returned to him, "the source from which it came." 
CONCLUSION 
The Limited Partners brought an action against Richtron and Paul 
Richins in the Lower Court. They also brought such action under the guise of 
Young Farms. Richtron is the stipulated, court decreed, liquidating general 
partner of Young Farms, as has NOT authorized such action or this Appeal. The 
rights of Richtron to control Young Farms have been adjudicated in another 
similar case involving the same subject matter. Only Richtron has the right to 
initiate such action and this Appeal. John T. Anderson, attorney for Richtron 
and Young Farms, has filed a "Notice of, or Motion for, Withdrawal of Appeal", 
dated July 3, 1984. Tower and Joseph S. Knowlton, Esq. have NOT been authorized 
by Richtron to appear in such action or this Appeal. 
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There has been NO settlement of the partnership affairs of Young Farms 
between Richtron and the Limited Partners which is a condition precedent to 
damages. The Limited Partners1 rights are specifically set forth in Section 
48-2-10, of the Act. The interest of the Limited Partners is a personal 
property interest in Young Farms, with the right to receive a share of the 
profits or other compensation by way of income, and to the return of their 
contribution as provided in Sections 28-2-15 and 48-2-16 of the Act. There is 
nothing there that confers on the Limited Partners a direct real property 
interest in the Allred Contract, even if they have invalidly continued Young 
Farms. The Limited Partners are NOT parties under any Contract covering the 
Allred Property. Although Limited Partners may, in a sense, be considered 
owners of the Allred Property, the legal title and rights under the Allred 
Property vest in Richtron. 
The Lower Court's "Order" entered January 9, 1984, was entered AFTER 
the case against Richtron and Paul Richins had been dismissed on Plaintiffs' own 
initiative without a "trial on the merits", and could not have affected the 
rights of Leo Richins (or Paul Richins) in the $10,431. Plaintiffs then sought 
to have a portion of its dismissed claims tried anyway, but without an opposing 
party. Upon Plaintiffs motion, the Lower Court conducted an Evidentiary Hearing 
on January 12, 1984, on an issue that had been dismissed. The Lower Court 
refused to take evidence from Richtron and Paul Richins because they were no 
longer parties to the action. Only Plaintiffs were allowed to present evidence. 
On February 1, 1984, the Lower Court entered its "Findings of Fact and Ruling". 
No judgment was entered thereafter. Neither such "Order" or Findings of Fact 
and Ruling" is a final order or judgment, nor could they be because the case 
against Richtron and Paul Richins had been previously "finalized" in the 
dismissal under the "Partial Summary Judgment" entered November 9, 1983. 
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Furthermore, neither one ORDERS, ADJUDICATES OR DECREES ANYTHING. 
The $10,431 is the property of Leo Richins. The Lower Court drew on a 
Letter of Credit he provided soley for Paul Richins. The case was then 
dismissed against Paul Richins. The Lower Court errored in not returning the 
$10,431 to "the source from which it came" as it represented it would. 
Richtron has NO obligation to Appellant, absent an accounting and a 
balance struck between the partners. Richtron has not defaulted under the terms 
of the Allred Contract, the Young/Richtron Contract or the RichtronAoung Farms 
Contract. Paul Richins has NO personal liability to pay Richtron obligations 
even if one existed, and Leo Richins, a non-party, certainly cannot be held 
liable. If this Court determines that the $10,431 cannot be returned to Leo 
Richins because he was not a party in such action, then the Lower Court errored 
in taking it from a non-party in the first place. 
DATED this 17th day of December, 1984. 
^(^&>^i~<i~v*-*z> 
LEO-H. RICHINS, 
Intervenor, Pro Se 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have this 17th day of Novenber, 1984, mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing "Brief of Intervenor" to John T. 
Anderson, HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK & LETA, Attorneys for Defendants, Richtron, Inc., 
and Paul H. Richins, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and Joseph S. 
Knowlton, Attorney for Appellants, 845 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102. 
^i£^Z^t^£lS 
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